This is the third installment of a four-part essay examining lessons learned from Ukraine for SOF in large-scale combat operations (LSCO). Authored by Erik Kramer and Paul Schnieder. You can read Part I, Part II, and Part IV here.
Part III
VI. Communications/Cyber/Information/Electronic Warfare (EW)
Observations
We have lumped together these four key areas (communications, cyber, information, and EW), because they are interrelated and separating them can lead to stove-piped and duplicated efforts.
Reliable, consistent communications within the AFU is a constant struggle. The Russian’s electronic warfare capabilities, which were already strong at the beginning of the war, have only improved. When the Russians turn on their EW systems, it shuts down communications, radios, cell phones, GPS, UAS, etc. It is not contiguous along the over 3000-kilometer line of contact (intense fighting along 970 kilometers of it), but when it’s used, nothing that emits or receives electronic signatures within its range works. Both the Ukrainians and Russians utilize encrypted and unencrypted communications. Cell phone usage is also ubiquitous. We often saw AFU brigade and battalion commanders with at least three different cell phones. Furthermore, both sides rely on social media to communicate and tout successes. It is essential to their information operations.
Both sides in the war have gotten very skilled at electronic direction finding and targeting artillery systems, radios, cell phones, and UAS operations. As a result, operators have to be disciplined in where they launch drones as well as when and where they use radios and especially cell phones. Artillery that is not in hardened emplacements must be displaced within minutes of a fire mission or risk counter-battery fire.
Another challenge is that a portion of drones are disrupted by Ukrainian EW systems as well as the rapidly iterated versions of drones they receive from foreign partners. This constantly evolving Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) means that preventing communications and UAS from being disrupted by adversary and friendly systems is an ever-evolving challenge. The Austrian Military Academy conducted a “deep dive” analysis of the EW fight in Ukraine if our readers would like more detailed information (we recommend all of their detailed analysis of the war in Ukraine videos available on YouTube).
One bright spot has been the Starlink system. Until 2024, it had proved immune to most jamming due to the sheer number of satellites and Starlink’s ability to quickly install software updates when there were EW interruptions. Russians are now able to disrupt Starlink systems, but it is still essential for AFU communications despite the interruptions.
Cyber-attacks are common, but have been mainly restricted to strategic targets as opposed to tactical ones. Regardless, USSOF systems would definitely be a target for cyber attacks in any LSCO with a near peer such as China or Russia since advanced communications are critical to SOF operations.
Information operations are used more at the strategic level and less so at the operational or tactical level. The main conduit for information operations is social media to include Telegram and WhatsApp.
Recommendations
SOF radio operators will have to be innovative with their communications plans and develop realistic and usable contingency PACE (primary, alternate, contingency, emergency) planning. Often during planning, by the time you get to “emergency” in PACE, it becomes a “fill in the blank” exercise, but during an EW congested environment, each element of PACE needs to be feasible. USSOF should not just rely on the traditional means of communications such as satellite, FM, HF radios, Iridium satellite phones. Plans should include: carrying Mini Starlink kits; mesh and metadata applications; raspberry pi’s (small Internet of Things (IOT) computers that can be used for virtually any role from serving as communication relays to cameras with motion sensing capability, to secure The Onion Router (TOR) routers that make it difficult to track online activities); tapping into local land line systems; issuing commercial emergency beacons such as the Garmin inReach Mini; and for more fixed positions, utilizing “wired” communications (the old TA312 field radios). Also rehearsing and training for a complete loss of communications for an extended period of time should be a part of any training exercise. The simulated loss of communications must be of sufficient time to affect operations and require operators to trouble-shoot and find alternate means.
Any cell phones should include local sim cards to avoid being identified as an American from any direction finding and monitored LTE (cell phone) networks. Russians will often use Orlan drones to replicate LTE networks to get cellular traffic and International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) numbers from users, which can be mitigated through use of metadata encryption applications (IMEI is a unique number to identify mobile phones). When not in use, cell phones should be turned off and placed in Faraday bags which block wireless signals from being transmitted or received.
USSOF should take into account what EW and EMI is created for various systems since this technology could not only impair adversary efforts but friendly efforts as well. It is imperative that spectrum analyzers are issued for drone operators to adjust frequencies in the field as well as enable friendly forces to effectively employ EW systems to counter adversary drones. Having the capability to adjust at the tactical level for employment and programming of communications systems is imperative to ensure continuous communications of all systems. This constant challenge is especially true as rapid iteration and proliferation of various new EW and EMI systems populate the battlefield. The threat electromagnetic spectrum is continually changing. Testing of friendly systems using friendly and adversary EW systems and the effects on communications systems has to be an integral part of planning and operations.
The greatest threat to USSOF communications is Russian direction-finding equipment and EW. SOF operations behind enemy lines will have to extremely disciplined with their transmissions to avoid detection. Use of low probability of detection and low probability of interception systems is critical. Communications will also have to be secure and brevity will be key. The U.S. concept of massive data reliant networks with all knowing and all-seeing Joint Operations Centers with live feeds and direct communications (which leads to micromanagement) to forward operating units is an artifact that should not be expected or replicated.
Another technique to overcome or confuse EW is through the use of decoys (fake weapons systems, unoccupied fighting positions, etc.) and emitters that replicate electronic signatures. The “white noise” can confuse or bait direction-finding and electronic warfare systems. The U.S. Army’s 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division recently used both successfully during a recent exercise at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) in Germany.
VII. Logistics/Medical
Observations
Unlike Afghanistan or Iraq or currently in Syria, the supply lines in Ukraine are contested and supply points and supply routes come under constant drone and indirect fires attacks. A consistent, reliable, and safe logistics chain is not guaranteed. This constant indirect fire also affects medical support. Most casualties that happen on the line of contact are not evacuated until nighttime or until an assault is over. A compounding issue that many units source their own logistics platforms and do not possess an organic MEDEVAC capability.
This gap necessitates that medical personnel or even non-medical personnel must be able to stabilize casualties for up to 24-72 hours and stabilize them enroute as there are no medical personnel to hand them off to until they reach definitive care. Most emergency medicine in recent U.S. conflicts has been predicated on the “Golden Hour”, having casualties evacuated within an hour, and that does not exist in Ukraine and it is doubtful that in a future LSCO fight, it will be available.
Current Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) and the corresponding Individual First Aid Kits (IFAK) are not sufficient for LSCO. Frontline medics in Ukraine have had to adjust their mentality and training to meet this demand. It includes basic surgeries and larger stockpiles of medical equipment to include significantly more bandaging for large injuries, painkillers, antibiotics, and oxygen. Massive Casualty situations (MASCALs) are also frequent and having enough medical supplies to stabilize multiple patients is often required.
The Ukrainians also have had to innovate when developing casualty evacuation plans and most plans are very ad hoc with a combination of military assets, civilian medical personnel, and volunteer organizations. High-speed dashes in makeshift ambulances are the norm. They are experimenting with unmanned ground drones to evacuate casualties as well. Since the Russians target logistics and medical stabilization points, these vulnerable positions are often built underground in bunkers or building basements. Furthermore, these stabilization points have to be able to displace quickly and there is a reluctance to displace given the break in medical care as well as the time and effort to move.
Recommendations
SOF medical planners will have to make two assumptions, medics will have to be able to sustain casualties for up to 24-36 hours and helicopter evacuation is unlikely. Use of helicopters near the forward line of troops (in Ukraine, it is called the “line of contact”) is very high risk in LSCO. This stems from the proliferation of man-portable air-defense systems, constant drone employment with no Restricted Operating Zones (ROZ) and lack of direct fire control measures that are a tradeoff for the widespread use of UAS. Use of or development of medical evacuation drones may be a significant requirement given the cost and challenges of traditional aviation platforms. “Friendly fire” is a significant issue as well. From discussions with U.S. military personnel operating in Syria, there have been several close calls with U.S. counter UAS forces almost engaging friendly manned aircraft as well as friendly UAS.
Fortunately, most SOF medics, especially Special Forces 18D medics, are trained to provide sustained treatment, but emphasis needs to be placed on additional procedures like emergency surgeries to Burr Hole surgery to relieve brain swelling, tourniquet removal protocols, and even field amputations. They will also have to do these procedures in an environment with the constant threat of indirect fire, the need for more medical supplies, and more deliberate planning with contingencies for medical evacuation. MASCAL training should be required. While individual first aid is critical, it is also vital that soldiers are heavily cross-trained to effectively respond to MASCALs or in the event the medic is a casualty themselves due to frequent MASCAL events from artillery, minefields, and UAS. Developing an “evacuation chain” of way stations or medical safe houses, is one possible option as well as using inclement weather or low illumination to your advantage. Ukrainian soldiers are carrying up to four tourniquets and the better trained units have “no notice” timed tourniquet drills for individual soldiers. We have included a list of resources at the end of this article for long-term care and lessons learned from Ukraine. Some of the more advanced medical procedures go well beyond the scope of practice for military medics, but if the choice is certain death or a risky procedure in the field, then the SOF medical community needs to have the debate.
Unhampered resupply is not guaranteed in LSCO. The days of local nationals driving “Jinga trucks” to firebases with most classes of supply are a thing of the past (Jinga trucks were brightly colored civilian vehicles with metal chimes attached that were used to transport supplies to U.S. and Coalition firebases in Afghanistan). Basic loads will have to be reevaluated. Many Ukrainian SOF units have individual basic loads of up to 15 30-round magazines. USSOF on longer duration missions should consider pre-planned caches and “speedball” resupply to include the use of drones. Farm drones in Ukraine can carry up to a 20-kilogram payload.
VIII. Evasion
Observations
Ukrainian SOF do not have a survival, escape, resistance, and evasion (SERE) school and combat search and rescue (CSAR) is non-existent for both sides. Also these authors do not know of any assisted escape and evasion missions or CSAR with the notable exception of the heroic helicopter casualty evacuation and resupply missions at the steel plant in Mauripol at the beginning of the 2022 war. Any evasion has either relied on the unplanned help of local sympathizers or partisans or was unassisted. Since rotary wing aircraft cannot consistently fly throughout the country due to the pervasive air defense threat on both sides of the line of contact, any assisted evasion does not involve aircraft. There have been numerous cases of individual soldiers and civilians making their way from occupied areas or enemy encirclements, but these are not traditional escape and evasion missions. Follow the embedded link for one recent story where an AFU SOF operator evaded Russian forces for three days.
Recommendations
It is challenging to compare U.S. escape and evasion efforts in a conflict like Ukraine with Ukrainian or Russian efforts since neither has a robust recovery program. However, if the U.S. were in a LSCO like in Ukraine, one can glean some recommendations. Basic land navigation and the ability to move long-distances on foot will be important. Establishing ratlines in advance and partisan linkup will also be critical. Evading in any area saturated with sympathizers or where the population is controlled by oppressive security forces will be extremely difficult to operate in. The basic principles of staying away from populated areas will be key unless evasion planning has included contacts with a robust partisan network that can assist evaders. With that said, Ukrainian partisans in occupied areas tend to operate more in urban areas than rural environments. SOF should consider robust escape and resistance planning with possible establishment of caches along preplanned evasion corridors. Furthermore, the systematic torture of Ukrainian prisoners of war by the Russians has been well-documented and Westerners who were captured while fighting for Ukraine have been sentenced to death in show trials. Surviving captivity with the U.S.’s current near peer threats will be a horrendous ordeal and require courage and resilience backed up by training. The Department of Defense’s Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA), who is the lead agency for personnel recovery, should consider deploying mobile training teams to refresh SOF units on survival, escape, resistance, and evasion (SERE) techniques and theater specific training prior to deployments in LSCO.
NOW LIVE: Part IV, Ukraine Lessons for SOF in LSCO – Training and Preparation. Subscribe to the SOFX Report below to make sure you don’t miss it.
Included is a list of relevant Resources, Vignettes, and Videos:
Communications
Starlink Mini https://www.starlink.com/support/article/07621adc-9a6f-8f94-6f27-361a78cce37d
Garmin inReach Mini Garmin inReach® Mini | Hiking GPS | Satellite Communicator
Electronic Warfare
*Highly Recommended* Austrian Army Officer Academy Deep Dive on EW in Ukraine-20 minutes: (1179) Electronic warfare: key technology in the Ukraine war – YouTube
Medical
Websites and apps for a Ukrainian nonprofit that provides information on tactical medicine and prolonged care.
TCCC PCC course – prolonged care for the casualties – clinical recommendations, video
TCCC – course of tactical medicine | Tactical Combat Casualty Care
Deployed Medicine – Apps on Google Play
Inside a Ukrainian Medical Stabilization Point-4 minutes: (1180) Saving Lives on the Front Line: Inside a Ukrainian Stabilization Point – YouTube
Article on Ukrainian Underground Hospital: The first underground hospital for the Armed Forces of Ukraine is put into operation – Militarnyi
Evasion
Ukrainian Military Intelligence (SOF) Officer Evades Capture for Three Days Behind Enemy lines-17 minutes: Ukrainian Officer Declared Dead Survives by Crawling Three Days Through Enemy Territory
A Year Among Occupiers, one year long evasion story-37 minutes: How an Azov Fighter Stranded in Mariupol Evaded Capture for a Year
Shaun Pinner, British Army veteran who served with the Ukrainian military, was captured at Mauripol, and survived seven of Russian captivity and a death sentence-30 minutes: Beth Rigby Interviews… Shaun Pinner
About the Authors
Erik Kramer is a Senior Fellow with the National Center for Urban Operations and co-founder of the Ukraine Defense Support Group. With over 33 years of military and government service, including time as a Special Forces officer, Kramer has been in Ukraine since 2022 advising the Armed Forces of Ukraine. He recently published his first book, American Dystopia: A Cautionary Tale, which uses fictional interviews to depict the United States two years after a societal collapse, exploring its impact on culture, the economy, education, international relations, and politics.
Paul Schneider is a former U.S. Special Forces Green Beret who volunteered to support humanitarian efforts in Ukraine. He has worked with nearly every type of Ukrainian Armed Forces unit, from Special Forces teams on tactical operations to Ukraine’s National Service Academy at the strategic level. Schneider is currently a senior foreign policy analyst and planner at Special Operations Command Pacific, where he develops plans for security cooperation, Special Operations campaigns, and Whole-of-Society Resistance Operating Concepts.
