This is the second installment of a four-part essay examining lessons learned from Ukraine for SOF in large-scale combat operations (LSCO). Authored by Erik Kramer and Paul Schnieder. You can read Part I, Part III, and Part IV here.
PART II
III. Fires
Observations
Artillery at the beginning of the Russian Special Military Operation was the king of battle and most casualty producing weapons system until early 2024 when it was overtaken by UAS by a wide-margin. Both sides are using UAS for multiple roles substituting capabilities traditionally done by different occupational specialties or units. Clearing trenches, creating breach lanes, first person view (FPV) ambushes, close quarters battle to clear rooms, and AFU SOF operations outside of artillery support range, will utilize kinetic UAS in place of artillery. We have not observed SOF units utilizing mortars. The AFU is burning out 155mm artillery barrels at an alarming rate. Some observers state that it is due to the high use and others say it is because they are being fired at “max charge” to avoid counter battery fire.
The war in Ukraine is one of the first traditional LSCO of the 21st century. As such, tanks and armored personnel carriers are an integral part of the fight. Even though the Russians have lost over 9000 tanks (over 20,000 armored vehicles),tanks are still a threat; even the much older models such as the T64. Often both sides use armor as a mobile artillery platform instead of integrated with infantry assaults. The AFU was very successful against Russian armor at the beginning of the war thanks to the widespread use of man portable anti-tank systems such as the British NLAW, French-German MILAN, and U.S. Javelin. Their prevalence proved critical in stopping the Russian push to Kyiv in February 2022. SOF units, operating on ATVs and using these systems, were able to decimate Russian armored convoys restricted by terrain and lack of navigation systems.
Close air support, for the most part, is nonexistent in the Ukraine war due to the constant threat from air defense systems. That is not to say that U.S. forces will not have the capability to call in close air support, but it does mean that it can be taken for granted and the air domain will be constantly contested. In a near peer fight, the U.S. might find itself facing parity where neither side is dominant. SOF will have to develop ways to have reliable indirect fires and close air support. In Afghanistan, when there was an aircraft shortage due to the worsening Iraq war, SOF relied on artillery and highly portable 60mm mortar systems.
Recommendations
USSOF has mentioned above, cannot assume that it will have reliable air support. SOF will have to develop work arounds such as artillery, mortars, UAS, or innovations with ground unmanned systems with mounted mortar tubes. USSOF will have to work even closer with its Air Force brethren to ensure air power is where it is needed, even in a parity situation. Current Air Force doctrine overcomes this challenge through “pulsed AirPower,” which is the concentration of airpower in time and space to create windows of opportunity for the rest of the force.” But it will take planning and will not always “be on call.” Artillery will potentially be the main source of fires. And Rocket Assisted Projectiles (RAP) rounds become a critical asset. Army Special Forces detachments should plan to deploy with 60mm mortar tubes and attend courses like the Mortar Leader Course. UAS and mortars are both a viable substitute for artillery and even CAS.
SOF should also focus on call for fire training as well as instruction on the capabilities and constraints of U.S. artillery systems. AT systems such as the Javelin, should become standard in resupply bundles for U.S. SOF. Additional training on these systems as well as the British and French systems should be commonplace.
IV. Unmanned Systems
We use the acronyms-Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), Unmanned Ground Systems (UGV), and Unmanned Surface (or Subsurface) Vehicles (USV) throughout this essay.
Observations
Almost every SOF operation in Ukraine includes the use of unmanned systems. As a matter of fact, unmanned systems are the main effort in most direct actions missions; especially missions inside Russia in the occupied areas. That is a sea of change compared to the past where operators were the main effort and unmanned systems were used in a supporting role.
In 2023 the AFU conducted the first assault with no artillery support, substituting various UASs, especially FPVs to suppress enemy positions. Then in December of 2024, in the Kharkiv region the AFU conducted a highly experimental, first of its kind all-drone assault on a heavily fortified Russian position. It was not a “swarm attack”, but instead they deployed dozens of drones conducting a variety of missions to include: reconnaissance, ground-based kamikaze drones, and quadcopter drones with ability to drop various munitions. The two-hour assault was very effective, using surprise and mass to overwhelm the defenders who could not effectively address the large number of drones coming from different air and ground approaches. A future with the possibility of all drone ground warfare is not just science fiction anymore. Also this last example demonstrates that mass and surprise still matter. Furthermore, the best counter UAS technology in the world can be overwhelmed with enough mass.
UAS have taken such a prominent role, that the AFU started an entire branch of the military solely dedicated to UAS. Ukrainian President Voldymyr Zelensky established the Unmanned Systems Forces in February 2024. This measure is especially critical given the short amount of time to train and deploy forces during protracted LSCO. An FPV/UAS operator can be trained in only a few days and can inflict significantly more casualties with significantly less risk than an infantryman or SOF operator that can often take months or years to produce and at great expense (of note, UAS operators and units are considered high value targets by both sides so must be protected). The use of AI for targeting and enemy identification shortens these training times.
Another significant reason for the rapid adoption and utility of UAS is that SOF and conventional units are having to cover significantly larger swaths of territory. On average, an AFU conventional brigade has to cover anywhere from approximately a 30 to 70 kilometer front. This vulnerability makes kill chains significantly more challenging, limits effective range of organic weapons systems, and limits a unit in contact’s ability to engage moving targets. UAVs, especially FPVs offer a precision guided munition with either no need for a complex kill chain, or just a single handoff of a target from another drone that the unit is using in conjunction with the FPV. This “Pocket Precision Guided Munition (PGM)” can also target specific vulnerabilities in enemy armor and defensive positions in a precise manner that artillery or mortars cannot replicate.
Unmanned systems, which include air, ground, and naval (surface or subsurface) represent a revolution in military affairs that are and will affect almost every aspect of combat operations. For SOF they represent a force multiplier especially since formations tend to be smaller and lack the firepower that a conventional infantry possesses.
Ukrainian SOF rely on small, disposable UAS for immediate reconnaissance or kinetic operations. The use of UAS and USV have achieved a strategic victory in the Black Sea. With only 11 ships in the entire Ukrainian Navy, SOF (includes HUR, SBU, etc. units), Ukraine has managed to defeat the Russian Black Sea Fleet and reopen the shipping corridors for grain.
On the other end of the unmanned fight, both the Ukrainians and the Russians have become the world experts on countering UAS, but it is a constant cat and mouse game with UAS frequencies changing often to counter the other side’s mitigation systems and wire-guided drones proliferating at an accelerating rate. Both sides use a combination of electronic warfare systems designed to stop UAS as well as kinetic systems and passive measures. This layered approach is the only way to counter UAS.
Unmanned systems technology is evolving rapidly, and a piece of equipment that can stop UAS today, will be obsolete tomorrow. Both sides in the Ukraine War are now fielding UAS that are tethered to the operator with a fiber optic cable with a range that can extend from 10 to 40 kilometers. That renders all cUAS that focus on cutting or interrupting the signal connection obsolete and has resulted in extensive use of nets to protect key supply routes far behind the front lines. Ukraine is developing counters as of the publication of this paper such as balloons.
Recommendations
USSOF already incorporates unmanned systems in their operations, but more in a supporting effort. They should, when feasible, plan operations where unmanned systems are the main effort when conducting almost any type of operation. The loss of unmanned systems is acceptable and lowers the risk to the lives of operators when you replace a human kinetic attack with that of a drone.
SOF due the small size of its units, high risk missions, as well as lack of organic firepower should fully embrace unmanned systems. UAS are already an integral part of operations (USSOF unfortunately will be playing catch up with the technology). SOF also needs to focus on ground unmanned systems (UGV). Ukraine is investing more and more resources on these emerging systems. USSOF should eye these systems for the following missions: demining, breaching obstacles, reconnaissance, resupply, casualty evacuation, and kinetic operations. Just like Legos building blocks, operators need to have access to Commercial Off The Shelf systems that are easily modifiable for iterative development on the battlefield, not outdated drones built through slow procurement mechanisms and programs of record. One of the main goals of UGV research should be to develop a UGV that can conduct all of the missions mentioned above. The same goes for unmanned surface and subsurface (USV) for waterborne operations.
Counter UAS plans should be included in every step of the operation. USSOF will be just as vulnerable to UAS as conventional forces and in some cases, more exposed if not operating from fixed positions. It takes a layered approach to countering UAS and needs to include active, kinetic, and passive mitigation methods.
USSOCOM has been at the forefront of cUAS and tested and initially fielded some of the main systems that U.S. Army conventional forces are using now. They have fielded the wearable Bal Chatri (means birds of prey trap in Hindi) counter UAS detection and mitigation system along with the SmartShooter system that fits on top of an assault rifle. As mentioned, countering unmanned systems requires a layered approach and the technology is constantly changing; such as the already mentioned tethered drones. USSOCOM must take a very proactive approach to counter unmanned systems and realize that their current systems are quickly becoming obsolete. We equate the counter UAS fight to the ever-evolving counter IED fight in Afghanistan and Iraq. Low tech methods of mitigation must be employed such as: shotguns with birdshot; passive measures such as plastic netting that would be used typically for construction or covering fruit trees to protect key lines of communication; camouflage netting; overhead cover; masking anything with a heat signature (such as generators); and working in underground bunkers or in basements when possible.We recommend that USSOCOM field a mobile team whose job is to obtain, test, and field within weeks (not months or years) new counter unmanned systems from around the world as well as garnering best practices. As a former U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group alumni, my old organization was on the cutting edge of developing and fielding UAS and cUAS and in this author’s opinion, it was extremely short-sight to disband this unique unit with unique capabilities). Unmanned ground systems and subsurface drones are the next wave of unmanned systems as well as systems that operate completely autonomously using AI and swarms. The mantra for unmanned systems should be: expendable, adaptable, easy to use, easy to mass produce.
V. Intelligence & the Human Domain
Observations
We included intelligence and the human domain, because they are intertwined. The AFU relies heavily on information directly (or indirectly) from civilian citizens and partisans. And SOF operations require accurate and timely information to be successful. One of the main conduits of intelligence is through social media, specifically Telegram. The Ukrainians have developed a simple way to gather information from the population. It starts with specific Telegram, Signal, and What’s App channels. They have a resistance website where ordinary citizens in occupied areas can provide targeting information, information on leaders in the occupied areas, etc. Also they have manuals and instructions on how to resist in active and passive ways. As far as these authors know, it is one of the first uses of the internet to organize partisans and sympathizers.
Furthermore, there are several partisan groups operating in Russian occupied areas such as Atesh or the Mariupol Resistance which are more high profile. They have a Telegram channel that daily discusses their exploits and will pass along videos and pictures from their operations. Imagine partially running an insurgency online.
Collaborators are a very big problem in Ukraine. Remember, that Russia and Ukraine were closely linked in their founding. Kyiv Rus, the original name for a part of Ukraine centered on Kyiv, demonstrates this intertwined history. It is challenging to find a Ukrainian that does not have any personal ties to Russia either familial or someone close to them. For example, the Commander-in-Chief of the AFU, Colonel General Oleksandr Syrsky, is ethnically Russian. With that said, the Ukrainian SBU, security force, spends an inordinate amount of time targeting local collaborators. The Russian security services recruit Ukrainian spies online with offers of financial incentives.
Recommendations
SOF operations in a LSCO, especially in a heavily surveilled and policed area will be extremely challenging. It will require careful planning and the cultivation of local sources of information and supply. Partisan forces in places like Ukraine or Taiwan will play a pivotal role in SOF missions; especially any sustained missions behind enemy lines. Usually a Ukrainian “government in exile” exists for the Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine which are an excellent source of information about the local area. The use of advanced pilot teams, advanced force operations, and collaboration with both U.S. and partner intelligence and SOF will be key to understanding the operational environment. USSOF will have to be constantly vigilant about collaborators within partner force ranks and the local population. All operational planning, personal information, etc. will have to be safeguarded. No full proof way exists to protect against this threat beyond vigilance and providing critical mission information at the last minute to a partner force. Other safeguards include the collection of cell phones prior to a mission as well as placing team members in “isolation” 24-48 hours prior to a mission. We recommend dedicating one or two individuals to focus on operational security and force protection.
As mentioned above, social media will play an important role in gathering information and local atmospherics. We recommend using Dataminr First Alert to monitor social media and local news. Dataminr is a company that the Department of Defense has partnered with to monitor news, social media, etc. and provide near real time information on current events. It is free to all personnel with a .mil account. Also the exploitation of captured cell phones will provide valuable intelligence and the ability to listen in on enemy communications across social media platforms.
Included is a list of relevant Resources, Vignettes, and Videos:
*Highly, Highly Recommended* Documentary of a Day in the life of a Ukrainian UAS unit-20 minutes: In the Shadows: Darwin’s War
*Highly Recommended* Western combat veterans from the war in Ukraine training video on drones, trench warfare, etc., good assessment from a Westerner’s perspective-80 minutes: (1179) Combat Vets from Ukraine Explain Drone Warfare, Trench Warfare and More – YouTube
*Highly Recommended* The Killer Ground Drones Hunting Russians in Ukraine-22 minutes: https://youtu.be/pu5jdZ3GFvc?si=ogKc1d1UtRfMH5m2
*Highly Recommended* Inside the first ever all-drone assault by Ukraine, The Counteroffensive website:Inside the first ever all-drone assault by Ukraine.
Ukraine Veteran on Drone Tactics-9 minutes: (1179) Ukraine Veteran: “You need 4 Drones for 1 Hit” – YouTube
Article on Ukrainian Farm Drones’ Impact on the Battlefield: https://euromaidanpress.com/2025/01/18/forbes-russia-promises-soldiers-10-day-leave-for-capturing-ukrainian-baba-yaga-drones-it-cant-build/
Article on Ukrainian SOF raid on a Black Sea Platform using both operators and drone: The daring Ukrainian special forces raid on Russian-held sea platform | News UK | Metro News
About the Authors
Erik Kramer is a Senior Fellow with the National Center for Urban Operations and co-founder of the Ukraine Defense Support Group. With over 33 years of military and government service, including time as a Special Forces officer, Kramer has been in Ukraine since 2022 advising the Armed Forces of Ukraine. He recently published his first book, American Dystopia: A Cautionary Tale, which uses fictional interviews to depict the United States two years after a societal collapse, exploring its impact on culture, the economy, education, international relations, and politics.
Paul Schneider is a former U.S. Special Forces Green Beret who volunteered to support humanitarian efforts in Ukraine. He has worked with nearly every type of Ukrainian Armed Forces unit, from Special Forces teams on tactical operations to Ukraine’s National Service Academy at the strategic level. Schneider is currently a senior foreign policy analyst and planner at Special Operations Command Pacific, where he develops plans for security cooperation, Special Operations campaigns, and Whole-of-Society Resistance Operating Concepts.
