Recent assessments by Russian military blogger Zhivov reveal how Ukrainian forces have utilized advanced electronic warfare (EW) and drone tactics during their assault on the Kursk region. These tactics have played a pivotal role in disrupting Russian operations and gaining significant battlefield advantages.
Ukrainian Electronic Warfare Strategy
The Ukrainian Armed Forces (AFU) have implemented a methodical electronic warfare strategy that has severely compromised Russian communication capabilities. Zhivov reports that Ukraine has successfully closed nearly all control ranges for Russian communications, leaving only one or two frequencies operational. This forces Russian forces into a difficult position: either continue to operate under compromised connections, risking exposure to drone swarms, or cut off communication entirely, which significantly hampers their operational effectiveness.
In addition to narrowing operational frequencies, the AFU has adapted their drone frequencies to operate in ranges where Russian forces lack mass electronic warfare stations. This strategic frequency shifting has rendered Russian EW systems largely ineffective against Ukrainian drones, allowing them to operate with relative impunity. Ukrainian troops have deployed drones like the DJI Mavic, modified with non-standard range-shifting boards, in large numbers, creating significant challenges for Russian defenses. These drones have been used extensively for reconnaissance and precision targeting, further complicating Russian defensive efforts.
Under the cover of these drone swarms and communication blackouts, Ukrainian infantry units advance in small groups of 4-6 soldiers to secure strategic positions or defensive lines. These small-unit maneuvers are supported by UAVs that provide real-time intelligence and cover, enabling the infantry to move with minimal resistance. This approach has been particularly effective in dismantling Russian defensive positions, as the drones create confusion and disarray, leaving Russian forces vulnerable to follow-up attacks.
Zhivov also highlights that the AFU has allocated reconnaissance and Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) units into specialized forces tasked with executing precision strikes on Russian positions. These units, guided by real-time intelligence from drones and electronic warfare systems, have carried out highly effective operations against Russian forces. The combination of drone swarms and precision MLRS targeting has often left Russian forces with little time to react, leading to their destruction before they can effectively respond.
Russian Counterterrorism Operation in Response
In response to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast, the Russian National Antiterrorism Committee announced a counterterrorism operation in Belgorod, Bryansk, and Kursk oblasts on August 9. The Federal Security Service (FSB) Head and National Antiterrorism Committee Chairperson Alexander Bortnikov announced these operations, citing “sabotage and reconnaissance units” conducting “terrorist acts” in Russia and “units of the Ukrainian armed forces” carrying out a “terrorist attack” in Kursk Oblast.
This counterterrorism operation allows Russian authorities to take a series of measures, including suspending or restricting communication services, monitoring telecommunication channels, confiscating vehicles, and entering private property. Despite the escalating situation, the Kremlin has notably refrained from declaring a formal state of war or martial law, likely to downplay the scale of the Ukrainian incursion and prevent domestic panic.
The counterterrorism operation is led by Bortnikov, who has proven himself an effective manager during crises that threaten Russian domestic stability. However, the complicated command and control (C2) arrangement under Bortnikov may degrade the effectiveness of the Russian response. The operation involves units from the Russian Armed Forces, Rosgvardia, the FSB, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), which could lead to friction and bureaucratic obstacles.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has redeployed elements of the Northern Grouping of Forces and other units from lower-priority frontline areas to defend against the Ukrainian advance. Reports indicate that up to nine unspecified brigades may have been redeployed, including airborne battalions, naval infantry, motorized rifle brigades, and elements from various other regions. This redeployment, however, has contributed to the disorganization of Russia’s response, as these forces are a mix of frontline units, conscripts, and operational reserves with varying levels of combat experience.
As the Ukrainian forces continue to advance, there is growing evidence that they are preparing for a long-term occupation of parts of Kursk Oblast. Ukrainian forces have reportedly begun digging trenches, signaling an anticipation of static warfare along or near the existing front line.
Russian military correspondents have noted the Ukrainian trenching activities with concern, warning that once these defenses are established, it could become increasingly difficult for Russian forces to dislodge the Ukrainians. Russian columns attempting to reach the front line are reportedly being met with Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups, drones, and artillery.
