Ukraine: The Revolution in Warfare That the U.S. Army Is Not Prepared For – Part III

This essay is the final installment of a three part series by Erik Kramer. You can find Part I and Part II here. Subscribe to the SOFX Report for future series.

Part III

Fires

Ukraine is in an artillery war. The king of battle was the largest casualty producer for both sides and is unlike anything any Western military has seen since the Korean War or World War II (according to Lieutenant General Oleksandr Pavliuk, head of Ukraine’s ground forces, drones now kill more soldiers than artillery).¹ The heavy use of fires coupled with modern technology has made artillery a game changer on the battlefield. Both the AFU and Russian forces use unmanned aerial systems (UAS) as mobile forward observation posts and their accuracy and response times have progressively gotten better over the course of the war.² The increased use of AI has also increased the lethality of accuracy of all unmanned systems.

Russian artillery tactics have not changed much since World War II (their accuracy has improved drastically due to UAS). They still rely on massed fires and the heavy use of indiscriminate artillery fire. They do not have the quality control standards Western armies have so dud rounds as well as “short rounds” occur often. Also the dud rate for the recently procured North Korean artillery rounds is high. Some reports indicate a dud rate of 50%.³ Regardless of the high dud rate, mass still matters.

Russian 203mm 2S7M Malka heavy artillery at work.#Russia #Ukraine pic.twitter.com/pL7BpNyluQ
— BlueSauron👁️ (@Blue_Sauron) March 22, 2022

Some key takeaways for the U.S. Army is learning to utilize UAS as a forward observer platform. It extends the range of observable fires and is safer for the observer who normally would have to be within eyesight of the target. UAS can also be used to overwatch manmade and natural obstacles which might be minimally manned or not have soldiers present. UAS will need to be included in all planning and commanders and staff will need to provide UAS operators with a clear task and purpose. They will play a critical role in all aspects of modern warfare.

The U.S. cannot take for granted that they will have artillery superiority and effective counter battery fires. The Russians target anything with an electronic signature to include counter battery radar. In addition, the sheer volume of fire can overwhelm even the most robust artillery systems. The heavy use of artillery in Ukraine affects almost every aspect of ground combat to include: breaching, obstacle clearing, and mounted/dismounted movement, communications, UAS usage, medical evacuations, etc.

Of concern is the proposed removal of U.S. Army brigade artillery and the enhancement/reconstitution of corps and division artillery which will remove a working relationship that has taken years to develop.⁴ In addition, in the war of the future, proximity will matter; especially in an EW-constrained environment where communications can be blocked. In some cases, the AFU have had to utilize runners to call for fire when their radios were jammed.

Another lesson learned is the use of man portable air defense systems and anti-tank weapons systems at the lowest level. All soldiers should be trained on their use and these systems should not just be assigned to dedicated air defense soldiers. With the overwhelming use of UAS and the disputed air domain, air defense artillery soldiers cannot be everywhere. One of the reasons that Ukraine was so successful at the beginning of the war, is that anti tank systems were pushed down to the lowest level and teams of soldiers on ATVs quickly attacked Russian armored columns and withdrew rapidly.⁵ Now the roles are reversed and Russian soldiers are riding into combat on motorcycles and Chinese made ATVs albeit with limited results.⁶

Recent photo shared of a French Mistral MANPADS on a pedestal mount on the back of a pick-up #UkraineRussiaWar #Ukraine #SALW pic.twitter.com/YLaz8fAeTh
— Matthew Moss | Historical Firearms (@historicfirearm) August 11, 2023

Sustainment

The war in Ukraine will change the way the American military conducts logistics in a potential conflict with a near peer such as Russia or China. The U.S. Army will not have free reign in rear areas for resupply or medical evacuations. The constant use of highly accurate indirect fires and the constant presence of enemy UAS, make any concentrations of soldiers and equipment an immediate target. The Russians originally relied on trains to move supplies and maintained large supply dumps along rail lines which were easily targeted. In addition, the medical evacuation “Golden Hour” standard is not a guarantee. Many medical evacuations from the front lines take place at night, because daytime evacuations are so dangerous.⁷ Also due to the air defense threat, the U.S. will not always be able to fly out casualties. Current combat search and rescue techniques will have to be reevaluated.

Ukraine’s first underground hospital for military operations. September 3, 2024. (Source: The Ministry of Defense of Ukraine)

On a positive note, the U.S. and its Allies will not have to deal with the AFU logistics nightmare of so many varied weapons systems with different ammunition and maintenance requirements. This author observed a special operations unit with AK74s, SCAR assault rifles, and M4s. I asked the supply officer how he supplied all of these different weapons and he just laughed.

#Russia #Ukraine 🇷🇺🇺🇦: Quite interesting photo posted by a combatant of #Ukrainian Forces.
UA fighters appear to be armed with a suppressed FN SCAR-L assault rifle, M249 light machine gun and an AK-12 Obr. 2020 assault rifle (captured from #Russian VDV Troops). pic.twitter.com/zduIK1Off1
— War Noir (@war_noir) November 17, 2022

The “burn rate” for artillery is exponentially higher during artillery duels. The ability to quickly move larger quantities of artillery rounds to forward firing positions will be critical especially when supply points are heavily targeted. The U.S. military will have to reconsider ammunition expenditure rates with the goal of possibly greatly increasing rounds available for artillery.⁸ In addition, the Ukrainian military is burning through artillery barrels at an alarming rate.⁹ U.S. artillery units are not used to those sustained rates of fire which will require much more maintenance and barrel replacement.

The U.S. will also have to reconsider the “burn rate” for UAS. Ukraine is losing 10,000 drones a month.¹⁰ Cheap, expendable drones are the future. In addition, U.S. soldiers still treat drones as sensitive items and are fearful of crashing, damaging, or losing them. That paradigm must change.

Some of the key lessons learned are that medics must be trained in stabilization of patients for up to 12 hours (or longer). Emergency medical technician training mainly focuses on immediate life-saving measures and getting the patient to definitive medical care. Also medical stabilization points should periodically move or “jump” and always camouflage and should take into account cover and concealment during selection of a site. Throughout Ukraine, the threat of collaborators is constant and one must assume that any unit or position will be reported to the Russians within hours of occupation.

Also the use of unmanned ground vehicles is its nascent stages but they are already playing an important role as a method of resupply and casualty evacuation in the disputed Pokrovsk district in western Donetsk.¹¹ The U.S. would do well to place a priority on the development of unmanned ground vehicles for risky and mundane missions such as mine clearing, casualty evacuation, and resupply.

Ukrainian KNLR-E VEPR evacuation ground drone. May 2024, Ukraine. (Photo credits: Militarnyi)

Protection

Based on current combat operations in Ukraine, the U.S. military will have to change its approach to protecting the force. The U.S. is used to deploying and being relatively safe behind walls. In a modern war against a near peer threat, the U.S. will not always dominate the skies and the enemy will exploit the U.S. ‘s reliance on technology. The U.S. will not be able to assume the rear area is safe. Russian special forces operate in the rear area behind Ukrainian lines and will ambush soft skinned vehicles and medical stabilization points.¹² The protection of the rear area as well as a robust counter UAS capability will be manpower intensive. Collaborators will provide enemy forces pinpoint targeting information.

A Ukrainian serviceman holds an anti-drone device, Kyiv 2022. (Drop of Light / Shutterstock.com)

To counter the UAS threat, the U.S. military will have to take a layered approach. “One size does not fit all”. Protecting facilities, command posts, temporary perimeters, and vehicles require advanced planning and constant vigilance. Troops must understand the importance of cover and concealment; especially good overhead cover. Command posts, supply points, and medical facilities should consider going underground in basements or through construction.

Dispersal is also key. Large headquarters are easily targeted through direction finding of radio and cell phone transmissions as well as spotter UAS. Consider cargo netting around critical infrastructure or barrage balloons. Personnel must be dedicated to the counter UAS fight as well as protecting against air threats. The Russians are using attack helicopters along the line of contact.

As mentioned before, MANPADS distributed down to at least the company level will be important and require a philosophical change for the U.S. military where previously only air defense artillery soldiers employ them.

Other considerations are UAS hunter-killer teams with counter UAS technology (such as the SmartShooter site mounted on assault rifles or jamming/spoofing technology) as well as machine guns mounted on vehicles and the use of shotguns with birdshot.¹³ Every soldier should know what to do when they encounter a drone. They will not have the time to request shoot/don’t shoot orders from their chain of command. Soldiers, especially those conducting counter UAS duties, need to be empowered to make split second decisions when they come into contact with a drone.

An air defense unit of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, known as drone hunters (paparazzza / Shutterstock.com)

Leaders will have to develop and enforce a realistic policy with cell phone usage. Russians can easily detect foreign cell phone IP addresses and pinpoint their location; especially if they are concentrated. They can pinpoint them within a matter of minutes and call in artillery. Banning or collecting all cell phones is unrealistic. Soldiers will find a way around it and some of the worst offenders will be officers. It is the same situation with launching UAS. UAS operators will have to launch their platforms outside of their perimeters or risk being targeted.

Due to the EW threat, uninterrupted communications via radio or cell phone is not guaranteed. U.S. forces should stress contingency plans for all communications and consider realistic alternative means. For example, if U.S. forces will be static, consider using the vintage TA312 telephones which are linked by wire and can only be interrupted if the wire is cut.¹⁴ Also the Russians have not been able to defeat Starlink. The satellites are too small and too numerous. The U.S. military is experimenting with a Department of Defense version of Starlink.¹⁵

Leaders will also have to address social media usage. The Russians exploit social media to send messages to family members of Ukrainian soldiers with threats or false information saying that their loved ones have been killed or captured.¹⁶ Both sides are also using the geo location tagging in uploaded pictures to identify locations of units.

As mentioned before, social media will be extremely important for intelligence gathering and as a subset of that, protecting the force. Having an updated understanding of the way that locals communicate and when the method or platform changes is very important. The Telegram channels used in Ukraine change often so in any future conflict, U.S. forces should have “their finger on the pulse” of local communication avenues.

One area that has received scant attention is the psychological impact of modern warfare on soldiers. The constant presence of drones overhead coupled with artillery bombardments is taking a psychological toll on soldiers. Unlike Afghanistan or Iraq, where soldiers could have a reprieve when they returned to base, there is no sanctuary along the line of contact in Ukraine. Leaders, especially first line supervisors will have to closely monitor their soldier’s mental health more closely than in previous wars.

A Russian blogger on Telegram is incredulous that newly arrived frontline troops have been instructed that the best defense against FPVs is to lie still and pray they don’t see you.
The sound of the attacking FPV and the fear of the shaking Russian in this video is intense.
1/ pic.twitter.com/drfdHlvXdw
— Roy🇨🇦 (@GrandpaRoy2) December 17, 2024

Conclusion

U.S. forces must not “Ukrainize” future conflicts. There will be major differences in any future war. The Chinese in Taiwan will not have a scorched earth policy as the Russians do (at least initially). They will want to save Taipei and critical industries from destruction.

The scale and scope of the ground war in Ukraine is unlike any conflict the world has seen since the Korean War and the U.S. and its Allies need to ensure they are garnering the applicable lessons learned and discarding the ones that do not apply. The biggest game changers that this author has observed are the flooding of the battlefield with UAS for observation, kinetic strikes, artillery observation, and sniper operations and the unprecedented use of massed and accurate artillery/indirect fires. That coupled with the overwhelming use of landmines and obstacles as well as the heavy employment of electronic warfare will challenge the way the West fights. The increasing use of unmanned systems in the air, ground, and sea will only add to the complexity of modern war.

Also, disposable, expendable, and adaptable drones need to be the norm, not the exception down to the platoon level. Soldiers are still operating under the paradigm that drones are sensitive items that cannot be lost or destroyed. Ukrainian units that this author has worked with state that they lose 40% of their drone fleet weekly. The focus within the U.S. military has been on developing and countering aerial unmanned systems which I applaud, but they must not lose sight of ground and sea systems.

A drone operator from field medicine division Hospitallers (Drop of Light / Shutterstock.com)

The Ukrainian Navy, whose fleet was mostly captured by the Russians in 2014, has been able to defeat the Russian Black Sea fleet with unmanned systems (the Ukrainian Navy currently has 12 ships).¹⁷ That is a clear example of the “revolution” in military affairs. The only restriction on drone payloads are fuel consumption/battery life which will only improve as battery and fuel efficiency technology advance. Furthermore, the only restriction on the capabilities of unmanned systems is imagination.

The U.S. domination of the air and electro-magnetic spectrum is not guaranteed and those domains will be constantly contested. This will add to the fog of war and require a fresh approach to mission command at every level in order to empower subordinate leaders (especially company grade officers) to act on their own without constant guidance. Air defense artillery training and systems will have to be pushed down the battalion and below. Furthermore, all soldiers should be familiar with how to use them. Engineer assets will have to be increased and possibly doubled to counter the expected losses from artillery, drones, and minefields. In addition, the U.S.’s entire logistics and medical evacuation systems will have to be reevaluated with an eye towards more dispersal, a relook at basic loads, and training medics to provide sustained care for up to 24 hours.

Unfortunately, the days of minimal casualties are more than likely over and commanders as well as political leaders will have to reevaluate their risk acceptance levels. In addition, they will have to adjust and change their cumbersome and plodding staff processes and the footprint of their staffs. Agile, scalable, and flexible timelines will be critical to staying ahead of the enemy’s information and decision cycle. Staffs (and commanders) must be able to go from the digital age to analog quickly when they suffer cyber attacks or power outages.

It does not matter if the future battlefield is on the plains and in the cities of Europe, the widely dispersed islands in the Pacific, the congested cities of the Middle East, or the megacities and villages throughout Africa. America’s adversaries, especially nation-states such as China, Iran, and Russia are taking the lessons learned from Ukraine and the U.S.’s actions in its wars since 2001 to target U.S. vulnerabilities and attack them asymmetrically. They will attempt to negate U.S. capabilities that are taken for granted such as technology and domination of the air and airwaves. Our satellites, which we rely on for everything from communications to navigation, are especially vulnerable. The Chinese are great copycats and will only amplify and improve on the Russian and Ukrainian tactics, techniques, procedures, and technologies that are working in Ukraine and apply them to any future fight with the U.S. Just observing the current fights in Gaza and Syria demonstrate that militaries and especially irregular formations are taking the lessons learned from Ukraine to heart.

The U.S. and its Allies should implement a coordinated combined, joint Ukrainian study with “boots on the ground” in Ukraine and a focus towards the next evolution in warfare or reset. It should take a holistic approach, incorporating observations of Chinese aggression toward Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Australia, while aligning with the U.S.’s current AirLand Battle and Multi-Domain Operations doctrines. This includes requiring land-based services to examine U.S. operational and tactical warfighting methods through the lens of Warfighting Functions.

The U.S. should also take a hard look at combined arms operations with corps and divisions being the dominant maneuver elements. These formations could be too cumbersome and not agile enough for a modern battlefield under constant surveillance and with very accurate indirect fires. As mentioned, units at the battalion level and below must be able to operate as semi autonomous task forces with enough enablers to conduct combat operations in a fast-paced high-tech environment. The entire doctrine, mission table of organization & equipment (MTOE), rank restructure, and mission essential task lists (METL) should be scrubbed for Army and Marine Corps units. The modern battlefield has changed, and the U.S. military must adapt as well and not fall back on the Cold War model of a division-centric Army. The corps and division are important and necessary, but should be much more modular and adaptable. They currently are not.

Ukrainian President Zelensky visiting an underground command post in the Donetsk region. (Photo: The Presidential Office of Ukraine)

Soldiers of the 116th Cavalry Brigade Combat Team operate their Tactical Operations Center at Fort Irwin, Calif, 2015. (Photo by Sgt. Anita VanderMolen, 115th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment, Oregon Army National Guard))

Modern war is complex and as seen in Ukraine, what is old is new again, such as trench warfare and unfortunately the U.S. Army’s corps/division-centric approach to warfare. The U.S. Army must change or at least adapt its hierarchical culture to be okay with much more decentralized operations and the empowerment of subordinate leaders and units.¹⁸

Commanders can easily lose focus on the common operating picture with the flood of information at the fingertips of commanders as well as the constant threat of electronic warfare so this organizational shift is necessary for the modern battlefield. The U.S.’s future enemies will suffer from the same issues trying to understand and coordinate efforts across all domains and with the tyranny of distances and forced dispersal. That will be the U.S. military’s strength if the U.S. Army makes the changes now for the increased fog of war. The overwhelming flow of information will be a challenge for even the most capable commanders. It will require a cultural change with senior commanders being okay with relinquishing some of the control they have come to expect. It also begs the question, is the modern battlefield too complex for just one overall commander or is there a different way? Redundancy and dispersal will be critical.

A revolution, not an evolution, in military affairs is occuring in Ukraine and spreading to other conflicts. The convergence of rapidly advancing, readily available technology coupled with instantaneous connectivity is changing the very nature of warfare. We can see these changes occurring in society as well. Piecemeal changes or reverting to a Cold War paradigm is the wrong answer. The U.S. Army downplays these changes at their own peril. The pace of previous wars allowed for time to adapt and learn albeit at a cost to human lives and resources. The rapid pace of change in future wars will not provide this space. To quote a Ukrainian drone operator, we adapt or perish.

Endnotes

1. Dylan Burns and Patrick Hilsman, “Dug in: Artillery shortage defines war for Ukraine’s frontline soldiers,” UPI, December 1, 2023, https://www.upi.com/Voices/2023/12/01/ukraine-inside-ukraine-artillery-war-donetsk-frontline-shortage/4901701288819/; see also David Hambling, “Just ‘A Moment in History?’ Busting Myths About FPVs,” Forbes, June 20, 2024, https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2024/06/20/just-a-moment-in-history-busting-myths-about-fpys/.

2. David Hambling, “How Drones Are Making Ukrainian Artillery Lethally Accurate,” Forbes, May 12, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2022/05/12/drones-give-ukrainian-artillery-lethal-accuracy/?sh=2c899d00424b.

3. Cho Jinwoo, “Ukraine military official: half of all North Korean shells are duds,” RFA Korean, March 4, 2024, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/shells.

4. “U.S. Army’s Way Forward: 5 New Division Organizations,” Battle Order, Apr 11,2023, https://www.battleorder.org/post/waypoint-divisions.

5. Dan Parsons, “Ukrainian Battle Buggies Are Out To Kill Russian Tanks,” The Warzone, April 28, 2022, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ukrainian-battle-buggies-are-out-to-kill-russian-tanks.

6. “Why Russian troops are attacking on motorbikes,” The Economist, August 13, 2024, https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2024/08/13/why-russian-troops-are-attacking-on-motorbikes.

7. Matt White, “No ‘golden hour’? How Army medicine is changing for the next war,” Task and Purpose, June 20, 2023, https://taskandpurpose.com/news/golden-hour-army-medical-training-ukraine/.

8. Alejandra Rocha and Michael O’Hanlon, “Artillery usage could show the future course of the Ukraine war,” The Hill, April 7, 2023, https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3934532-artillery-usage-could-show-the-future-course-of-the-ukraine-war/#:~:text=Ukraine%E2%80%99s%20use%20of%20artillery%20peaked%20from%20May%20through,about%203%2C000%20rounds%20a%20day%20in%20November%202022.

9. John Ismay and Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “Artillery Is Breaking in Ukraine. It’s Becoming a Problem for the Pentagon,” The New York Times, November 25, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/25/us/ukraine-artillery-breakdown.html.

10. David Hambling, “New Report: Ukraine Drone Losses Are 10,000 Per Month,” Forbes, May 22, 2023, https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2023/05/22/ukraine-drones-losses-are-10000-per-month/?sh=6b01f1e9384a.

11. “Ukraine demonstrates medical evacuation equipment to Western partners” Militarnyi, May 29, 2024, https://mil.in.ua/en/news/ukraine-demonstrates-medical-evacuation-equipment-to-western-partners/

12. Charlie D’Agata, Agnes Reau, and Tucker Reals, “Inside a front-line Ukraine clinic as an alleged Russian cluster bomb strike delivers carnage,” CBS News,July 10, 2023, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ukraine-russia-war-cluster-bomb-damage-inside-a-front-line-clinic/.

13. Smart Shooter, accessed on August 17, 2024, https://www.smart-shooter.com/.

14. TACTICOM USA, accessed on August 17, 2024, https://www.tacticomusa.com/products/telephone-wire-comm-equipment/telephone-wire-comm-equipment/TA-312-PT/.

15. Sandra Erwin, “SpaceX providing Starlink services to DoD under unique terms and conditions,” Space News, October 3, 2023, https://spacenews.com/spacex-providing-starlink-services-to-dod-under-unique-terms-and-conditions/.

16. Michael Holloway, “How Russia Weaponized Social Media in Crimea,” The Strategy Bridge, May 10, 2017, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/5/10/how-russia-weaponized-social-media-in-crimea.

17. Jeff Schogol, “Russian soldier gave away his position with geotagged social media posts,” Task and Purpose, January 23, 2023, https://taskandpurpose.com/news/russian-military-opsec-failure-ukraine/.

18. “Ukrainian Naval Forces (2025),” World Directory of Modern Military Warships, accessed on December 18, 2025, https:www.wdmmv.org/ukrainian-naval-forces-ukraine.php.

19. Stephen J. Gerras, Leonard Wong, and Charles D. Allen, “Organizational Culture: Applying A Hybrid Model to the U.S. Army,” U.S. Army War College, November 2008, https://ssl.armywarcollege.edu/dclm/pubs/Organizational Culture Applying a Hybrid Model to the U.S. Army Nov 08.pdf.

Biography

Erik Kramer is the cofounder of the Ukraine Defense Support Group (UDSG) in Kyiv, Ukraine, where he has been training the Ukrainian Armed Forces since 2022. A former U.S. Army Special Forces officer with 26 years of service, he has held roles in the Pentagon, the Asymmetric Warfare Group, and Booz Allen Hamilton, specializing in emerging threats, Russian tactics, and advanced technologies. Kramer is also a strategic fellow with the National Center for Urban Operations and the author of “American Dystopia: A Cautionary Tale.” He holds degrees from The Citadel, Naval Postgraduate School, and the Defense Language Institute and is completing his doctorate at King’s College London.

Ukraine: The Revolution in Warfare That the U.S. Army Is Not Prepared For – Part III

Authored by Erik Kramer

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Ukraine: The Revolution in Warfare That the U.S. Army Is Not Prepared For – Part III

Authored by Erik Kramer

Part III

Fires

Sustainment

Protection

Conclusion

Endnotes

Biography

Noah Schmidt

Trending News

Graphic Helmet Footage Captures Intense Hand-to-Hand Combat between Ukraine and Russian Soldiers

Former Wagner Group Mercenary Arrested After Illegal US Border Crossing

Russian Forces Ramp Up Use of ‘Unjammable’ Fiber-Optic Drones Deep Within Ukrainian Positions

Christmas-Themed Drone Strikes Allegedly Target North Korean Troops as Total Casualties Reportedly Reach 200

US MQ-9 Reaper Drone Allegedly Targets Vehicle with R9X Missile in Idlib, Syria

News

Services

Resources

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