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New tools to systematically build cooperation: Theory of repeated games | Science Daily

New tools to systematically build cooperation: Theory of repeated games | Science Daily

Social dilemmas occur when individual desires clash with group needs. How can people be encouraged to cooperate when they have reason not to? Scientists show that if the social dilemma that individuals face are dependent on if they work together, cooperation can triumph. This finding resulted from a new framework that they introduced, which extends the entire theory of repeated games. Moreover, their work provides tools to systematically build cooperation.

When what we want as individuals clashes with what is best for the group, we have a social dilemma. How can we overcome these dilemmas, and encourage people to cooperate, even if they have reason not to? In a paper released today in Nature, Christian Hilbe and Krishnendu Chatterjee of the Institute of Science and Technology Austria (IST Austria), together with Martin Nowak of Harvard and Stepan Simsa of Charles University, have shown that if the social dilemma that individuals face is dependent on whether or not they work together, cooperation can triumph.

Source: New tools to systematically build cooperation: Theory of repeated games